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 This paper proposes and tests a simple joint explanation for i) increases in marital and nonmarital 
birth rates in the United States over recent decades, ii) the dramatic rise in the share of nonmarital births, 
and iii) the pronounced racial differences in the timing of childbearing. The explanation arises from 
differences across time and race in the attractiveness of marriage and opportunities for investment in 
human capital.  For given preferences, a decline in the marriage rate necessarily causes both the marital 
and nonmarital birth rates to increase, with no change in the total birth rate. This model exhibits 
exceptional power in replicating salient features of childbearing behavior. Our results suggest that 
changes in marital and nonmarital birth rates, as well as in the share of nonmarital births, arose primarily 
from changes in marriage behavior, not from changes in fertility; and that racial differences in the timing 
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I.  Introduction 
The extraordinarily rapid rise in nonmarital birth rates in the United States over the past several 
decades – and correspondingly in the share of births to unmarried women – has elicited calls of alarm 
from social observers, politicians, and researchers, alike, as well as a vast literature on the potential role 
of various public policies in fostering changes in childbearing behavior.  A simultaneous, if 
proportionately smaller, rise in the birth rates of married women – against a backdrop of relatively flat 
total birth rates – has captured less attention, but poses an apparent paradox:  How can the birth rates of 
married and unmarried women both rise, while the total birth rate (married and unmarried women 
combined) be relatively constant?   
 Racial differences in marriage and birth rates have been an additional source of concern in both 
academic and policy circles, especially the dramatically lower rates of marriage and higher rates of 
nonmarital births among blacks than whites.  Less familiar, but nonetheless prominent in the data, is the 
contrast between higher total birth rates for blacks than whites in the teens and early twenties, and lower 
total birth rates for blacks than whites beginning in the mid-twenties.  Clearly, black and white women 
time their childbearing differently.  The timing difference has become more pronounced over the past 
decade despite increasingly similar total fertility rates among blacks and whites.  Indeed, total fertility 
rates for the two groups have been virtually identical for the past several years, suggesting that desired 
family size may not differ significantly across the two races.1   
We propose and test a simple joint explanation for i) the increases in marital and nonmarital birth 
rates in recent decades, ii) the dramatic rise in the share of births to unmarried women, and iii) the 
pronounced racial differences in the timing of childbearing – one that does not appeal to differences in 
preferences regarding either the number or timing of births.  We argue that the explanation arises, in 
substantial part, from differences across time and race in the attractiveness of marriage and opportunities  
                                                          
1 The total fertility rate is published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as an indicator of 








for investment in human capital.   Our model produces a causal relationship between marriage behavior 
and measured birth rates that is independent of the preferences governing childbearing behavior.  For 
given preferences regarding family size and the timing of births, a decline in the marriage rate necessarily 
causes both the marital and nonmarital birth rates to increase.  The increases are the result of a selection 
effect typically neglected in studies of the determinants of nonmarital childbearing.2  The steep decline in 
marriage rates overall, as well as persistent racial differences in marriage rates, make this selection effect 
central to the model’s striking empirical power. 
 Human capital investment opportunities are important in explaining the timing of births in the 
model.  If whites have better access to investment opportunities than blacks during the early childbearing 
years, then, other things equal, the total birth rates of young black women will exceed those of young 
white women.  However, the opposite will be true at later ages.  The birth rates for white women will 
exceed those of black women during the mid-to-late childbearing years.  Hence, differences in investment 
opportunities are a viable explanation for the distinctive differences in the age profiles of black and white 
birth rates.   
The model we present is stark, with sharply simplifying assumptions.  Even so, the model 
exhibits exceptional power in replicating salient features of childbearing behavior for women in the 
Unites States.  In doing so, it offers a common theoretical explanation for some of the most widely 
studied trends in fertility in the past several decades.  The model provides closed-form solutions for 
marital and nonmarital birth rates, as well as the share of births to unmarried women (often termed the 
illegitimacy ratio, but referred to here as the nonmarital birth share).  The solutions imply stringent 
restrictions on the relationships between these variables and the “single share” – the proportion of women 
who choose not to marry.  The strength of the empirical support for the restrictions, given the stark 
simplicity of the theoretical model, suggests that the model identifies effects of central importance in 
                                                          
2 A notable exception is Smith and Cutright (1988).  The authors speculate (p. 244) that declines in marriage rates 
put upward pressure on nonmarital birth rates by adding to the unmarried population “…an aggregation of women 
who are differentially selected with respect to a crucial criterion for out-of-wedlock births….”  While Smith and 








understanding the behavior of birth rates.  The contribution of the paper is in isolating and illustrating 
these effects, and the highly stylized theoretical model serves this end well – a case, we argue, in which 
less is more, and “the proof of the pudding is in the taste.” 
Overall, our findings suggest that key aspects of childbearing behavior in recent decades arise 
more from changes in marriage behavior than from changes in fertility behavior, per se.  In addition, the 
timing of childbearing, including racial differences in timing, may be explained in substantial part by 
opportunities women have for investments in human capital.  Our findings place much of the recent 
literature on the effects of public policies on fertility behavior in a different context, and suggest that 
future efforts could be productively directed toward understanding marriage behavior and the incentives 
for investments in human capital, especially for black women. 
We begin in Section II with the theoretical model.  Section III follows with the key empirical 
implications of the model, along with corresponding figures summarizing actual U.S. experience over the 
past several decades.  Section IV presents formal empirical estimates of the model, specified in terms of 
predictions for birth rate ratios and the share of births to unmarried women.  Section V discusses the 
implications of our findings and directions for future research. 
 
II.  Conceptual Framework 
 
This section describes a simple theory of childbearing and marriage in the presence of 
opportunities for investments in human capital.  The model offers two key insights central to 
understanding observed patterns in childbearing, including racial differences in those patterns.  First, we 
suggest that increases in the share of unmarried women reflect changes in the marital status of women 
with a lower probability of giving birth than the average married woman, but a higher probability of 
giving birth than the average unmarried woman.  Accordingly, when such women “leave” the pool of 
married women and enter the pool of unmarried women, average birth rates of both groups rise, even 








increases in both marital and nonmarital births rates, absent a corresponding change in total birth rates, is 
not a paradox at all.3
The effect of marriage behavior on measured birth rates has corollary implications for the 
nonmarital birth share, hereafter denoted NBS.  As demonstrated below, an increase in the single share 
produces an proportionate increase in NBS share for given marital and nonmarital birth rates. However, 
the single share exerts an additional, equally powerful, effect on NBS by raising the nonmarital birth rate 
relative to the marital birth rate.  Consequently, we predict a magnified effect of increases in the single 
share on the nonmarital birth share.  In view of declines in marriage rates in recent decades, the theory 
offers a compelling explanation for the pronounced increases in nonmarital birth shares over the period. 
We illustrate the paper’s second central insight by positing opportunities for investments in 
human capital pertinent to women primarily in their early childbearing years.  The pursuit of these 
opportunities is assumed to produce delays in both childbearing and marriage.  The consequences include 
not only a lower marriage rate among young women, but also a correspondingly lower birth rate among 
unmarried young women.  To the extent that investment opportunities are disproportionately available to 
black and white women, the model predicts differences in the timing of births across races – but not 
necessarily in total lifetime birth rates – consistent with the patterns emerging in recent U.S. data. Finally, 
the model is remarkably successful in explaining differences in the nonmarital birth share across age 
groups and across races. 
The key theoretical results follow directly from a few simple definitions and a small number of 
deliberately strong assumptions, as outlined below. 
A. Definitions 
Let 
 MB  be the number of births to married women,  
UB be the number of births to unmarried women, 
 M  be the number of married women, 
U be the number of unmarried women. 
                                                          








Define the total birth rate, the marital birth rate, the nonmarital birth rate, the nonmarital birth share, and 
the single share as follows:  
TBR  is (MB+UB)/(M+U), the total birth rate, 
MBR is MB/M, the birth rate of married women, or the marital birth rate,  
UBR is UB/U, the birth rate of unmarried women, or the nonmarital birth rate, 
NBS is UB/(MB+UB), the share of nonmarital births, or the nonmarital birth share, 
Su is U/(M+U), the fraction of women not married, or the single share. 
 
Note that the variable NBS – the share of births to unmarried women – can be written in terms of the 
single share (Su) and the ratio of the nonmarital to the total birth rate (UBR/TBR).   
 
NBS  =  [U/(M+U)]•[UB/(MB+UB)]•[(M+U)/U]  
=  [U/(M+U)]•(UB/U)•[(M+U)/(MB+UB)] 
=  Su•(UBR/TBR)        Eq. (1) 
 
 
Eq. (1) is a common basis for demographic decompositions of NBS (as in Smith et al., 1996), and a focal 
point of our theoretical and empirical contributions.  
B.  Childbearing Behavior 
 Women vary in their preference for children, which is captured by a parameter, γ, that measures 
desired family size.   In a fully general life-cycle model, marriage and births would be jointly and 
endogenously determined.  Our more simple model is consistent with a “fixed-target” model of fertility 
(c.f. Heckman et al.,1985).  In the end, we rely on the strength of the empirical tests to justify the 
simplicity of the fixed-target approach.  We abstract from the various factors that cause desired and 
realized births to differ, so that γ also measures total births to a woman during her childbearing years.   
Also, we focus on births during the prime adult childbearing years, which we assume begin at age 20 and 
extend through age 39 for all women.4  Since our data are available by 5-year age intervals, the theory is 
developed as a four-period model, with the four periods corresponding to the age intervals 20-24, 25-29, 
30-34, and 35-39. 5   Successive cohorts of women are indexed by the subscript τ, where τ denotes the 
                                                          
4 Elsewhere (Gray et al., forthcoming b), we examine the marriage and fertility behavior of teenagers aged 15-19. 








chronological time at which a cohort is in the first period of its childbearing span.  Choice of family size, 
γ, is exogenous with respect to the model (in particular, it is independent of marital status), though marital 
status is not independent of γ, as described below.   Furthermore, γ is distributed uniformly across women 
on the interval [0, Pτ], where 0≤Pτ≤1 and Pτ is allowed to vary by cohort.6   
 Now consider a representative group of zτ women drawn from cohort τ.  If the women are 
indexed and ordered by their preference for children, then the γ associated with the nth “ordered” woman 
in the group is (n/z)P, as shown in Figure 1 below.   (Note that the cohort subscript τ has been suppressed 
to streamline notation.)  Figure 1 orders women along the horizontal-axis and their corresponding 
preference for children, γ, along the vertical axis.  The relationship depicted is linear, a consequence of 
assuming that γ is uniformly distributed across women in the group, and one that makes the calculation of 
lifetime births for partitions of the group particularly expedient.7  
[Figure 1 here] 
 Propositions (P1) through (P3) below give the lifetime birth rates for the first n ordered women in 
the group, the remaining (z-n) women, and the group as a whole.  Later, when n is identified with the 
number of women in a group who choose not to marry at any age, these propositions produce, 
respectively, the nonmarital, marital, and total lifetime birth rates of the group. 
(P1) for the first n ordered women in the group, the average number of lifetime births 
per woman (the lifetime birth rate) is (1/2)(n/z)P,   
(P2)   for the remainder of the group, the lifetime birth rate is (1/2)[(n/z)+1]P, 
(P3)   the lifetime birth rate for the group as a whole is (1/2)P. 
 
                                                          
6 We are far from alone in assuming that family formation and marriage are driven by innate unmeasured 
propensities that vary across women (e.g., Upchurch et al., 2002, p. 313).  The assumption that childbearing 
behavior is determined by a single characteristic drawn from a uniform distribution is, however, exceptionally 
strong.  In this regard, our work more closely parallels Udry’s (1994, 2000) model of within-sex differences and 
recent work suggesting that fertility arises in substantial part from deep genetic influences (e.g. Kohler et al. 1999 
and Rodgers et al. 2001).      
7 As a practical matter, the uniform distribution will likely best approximate the actual distribution of lifetime births 
if the extreme value P is extrapolated from the mean observed in the data (i.e., twice the mean), rather than setting it 








In the simplest version of the model, we assume that the number of births to a woman of a 
particular age is a fraction θi of her lifetime birth rate, where i = 1, 2, 3, 4 indexes the four successive 
(five-year) periods of a woman’s childbearing life.  The θi may vary by cohort, but always sum to one – a 
woman achieves her desired number of lifetime births by the end of her childbearing years.  Furthermore, 
θ1 > θ2 > θ3 > θ4 in this baseline model.  That is, women spread childbearing out over time, but typically 
prefer to have more children early than late.  Reasons could include biological/health factors, a positive 
discount rate, greater security during retirement, etc.  It is against this baseline description of childbearing 
that we measure of the effects of investment opportunities available to women in their early adult years. 
C.  Marriage Behavior 
 Our model of marriage allows the marriage behavior of women of a particular age to change over 
time – that is, to vary by cohort – in response to changes in the net benefits of marriage.  The benefits to 
marriage are assumed to increase in the number of children a woman plans to have over her lifetime, but 
are not realized until she actually begins childbearing.  Other factors relevant to the decision to marry – 
e.g. education levels, earnings, unemployment rates, etc. – are captured in a measure of net benefits that 
we denote “C”.  These factors, which are assumed common to the women of a particular cohort, are the 
underlying source of  the “exogenous” variation in Su, by race and cohort (and therefore across time), that 
gives empirical content to our model.  For a given value of C, there exists a critical value of γ, denoted γ*, 
for which it is true that women with γ > γ* marry, and women with γ < γ* do not marry.  Note that γ* 
depends (positively) on C, and so may also vary by race and over time.  
D.  Investment Opportunities 
 
The behavior described in the preceding sections is the benchmark against which we measure the 
effects of investment opportunities available to young women.  To summarize, this baseline scenario is 
one in which lifetime births vary across women and may also vary across cohorts.  Age-specific birth 
rates are a fraction of lifetime births, and decline monotonically with age.  Women with sufficiently high 








she is young (in the first childbearing period of life), and the proportion of women who remain single is 
constant over the life of a cohort. 
We now introduce investment opportunities into the model.  The opportunities, in the form of 
investments in human capital such as higher education, are limited to the youngest group of women, those 
in the first of the model’s four childbearing periods.  Of course, more generally, some investment 
opportunities might also extend into later childbearing periods, but here we assume that these are modest.  
If undertaken, investment indirectly raises utility later in life (e.g. through increased income), but requires 
delayed childbearing.  We do not model the details of the cost-benefit calculation that determines whether 
a particular woman chooses to take advantage of investment opportunities when young.  Rather, we 
assume that the presence of opportunities causes a fraction α of the youngest women to undertake 
investment and, consequently, to delay childbearing. 
We allow the fraction of women who delay childbearing to vary by cohort.  For simplicity, 
however, investment opportunities are assumed independent of the childbearing propensity, γ.  Thus, the 
women who choose to delay are drawn randomly from each cohort and have lifetime childbearing 
propensities representative of their cohort.  On average, these women plan the same number of lifetime 
births as women who do not delay, but distribute the births foregone in the first childbearing period over 
the remaining three age periods in proportion to the benchmark birth rates for each age. 
 E.  Putting it Together 
Finding age-specific, nonmarital birth rates for a cohort requires summing births over those 
married women who have chosen to delay marriage and childbearing in order to undertake investment 
and those who have not.  The calculation of a cohort’s age-specific marital and total birth rates involves 
similar aggregations for married women and for the cohort as whole.   The algebra is straightforward, but 








Because the model limits investment opportunities to the youngest group of women, the birth 
rates given in eqs. (12) through (14) below for the youngest age group (20-24) differ in important ways 




MBR1  =  θ1(1-2α+Su1)(P/2)/(1-α)                Eq. (12) 
 
UBR1 =  θ1(P/2)(Su1 - α )2/(1-α)Su1                    Eq. (13) 
 
TBR1  =  θ1(1-α)(P/2)                            Eq. (14) 
 
Remaining Age Groups 
 
MBRi  =  θi(P/2)(1+Su)[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)]                         Eq. (15) 
 
UBRi =  θi(P/2)Su[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)]                    Eq. (16) 
 
TBRi  =  θi(P/2)[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)], for i = 2, 3, and 4.                       Eq. (17) 
 
 
Recall that the subscript i represents age, by five-year interval, beginning with the first of four 
childbearing age intervals.  The share of single women in the youngest age group, Su1, may differ from 
the single share common to the three older age groups, denoted simply Su.  The difference is due to the 
assumption that young women who choose to delay childbearing until the second period of life also delay 
marriage until that time, increasing the single share for the youngest women relative to older age groups.  
The cohort subscript τ has been suppressed in the birth rate solutions, as elsewhere in the text.   
We remind the reader that the solutions may vary across cohorts since the desired number of 
lifetime births, the baseline timing of births, investment opportunities that lead to delayed childbearing, 
and the attractiveness of marriage are all cohort specific.  Furthermore, there is no a priori reason to 
believe that these factors are independent of race.  Thus, the parameters that determine the birth rates 
given in eqs. (12) through (17) may vary by race, producing systematic differences in black and white 
birth rates.  While blacks and whites are often presumed to differ in their preferences over the number and 








differ for blacks and whites.  Indeed, the data and statistical tests presented in subsequent sections 
strongly suggest that differences in marriage behavior and investment opportunities, rather than intrinsic 
differences in the desire for children, are the primary cause of racial differences in observed birth rates.  
 
III.  Interpretation and Empirical Implications 
To facilitate interpretation and motivate our empirical tests, we begin by considering the 
benchmark case in which there are no investment opportunities available to young women.  A focus of the 
paper’s empirical applications is the hypothesis that this baseline scenario is more relevant to young black 
women than to young white women.8   
A.  Baseline:  No Investment Opportunities 
The absence of significant investment opportunities is captured by setting α=0 in eqs. (12) 
through (17).  This case produces birth rates that vary by age only to the extent that the baseline timing 
parameter, θi, differs by age: 
 
MBRi  =  θi(P/2)(1+Su)                   Eq. (18) 
 
UBRi =  θi(P/2)Su                   Eq. (19) 
  
TBRi  =  θi(P/2),  for i = 1, 2, 3, and 4.                 Eq. (20) 
 
 
In eqs. (18) through (20) all three birth rates increase as the preference for children increases, as 
one would expect.  Because we have assumed that the θi decline with age, all birth rates decline with age.  
Furthermore, given that women who prefer more children are more likely to marry in our model, the 
marital birth rate in eq. (18) exceeds the nonmarital birth rate in eq. (19).  More interesting are the effects 
of changes in the single share, Su, on birth rates.  Increases in Su cause both the marital and nonmarital 
birth rates to increase, even though the total birth rate is unaffected by Su.  In addition, the nonmarital  
                                                          
8 Differences in the percentage of black and white women who complete college is one indicator of racial 
differences in human capital investment opportunities.  In the late 1950s, the percentage of black women who had 









birth rate increases proportionately more than the marital birth rate.  To see this, note that UBRi increases 
linearly in Su (for given values of θi and P), while MBRi increases linearly in (1+Su).  Thus, while the 
absolute size of the increases in UBRi and MBRi produced by an increase in Su are identical, UBRi (with 
a smaller initial value than MBRi) increases proportionately more.  It follows that UBRi will also increase 
proportionately more than the total birth rate, TBRi, when Su increases.   
 Our model’s predictions for the behavior of MBR, UBR, and TBR, as expressed in eqs. (18) 
through (20), are difficult to test directly because the parameters that appear in these solutions – the θi and 
P – are not observable.  However, the model’s predictions for the ratios of birth rates, in particular, 
MBR/TBR and UBR/TBR, can be tested directly, as can the model’s implications for the nonmarital birth 
share, NBS.  As eqs. (21) through (23) verify, these ratios depend only on the single share, Su, which is 
observed in the data, but do not depend on age or the number or timing of births.  Nor do they depend on 
the costs and benefits of marriage (captured in the parameter C), except as reflected indirectly in Su.   
 
MBRRi  =  MBRi/TBRi =  (1+Su)        Eq. (21) 
 
UBRRi   =  UBRi/TBRi =  Su                    Eq. (22) 
 
NBSi    =  Su• (UBRi/TBRi)  =  Su2        Eq. (23) 
 
Note that the birth rate ratios MBRRi and UBRRi both increase one-for-one with increases in Su.  Indeed, 
UBRRi  is equal to Su.  Using this result in eq. (1), we see that an increase in Su raises NBSi both because 
Su appears directly in the expression for NBSi, and also because it raises UBRRi/TBRi.  Thus, the single 
share has a magnified effect on the nonmarital birth share and, for the baseline case, NBSi becomes 
simply Su2, as indicated in eq. (23).     
To summarize, when investment opportunities for young women are very limited, as 
hypothesized in the case of young black women, we should observe: 
Implication 1:  The sum (1+Su) closely tracks the ratio of the married birth rate to the total birth 









Implication 2: The single share, Su, closely tracks the ratio of the unmarried birth rate to the 
total birth rate, UBRR. 
  
Implication 3: The squared value of the single share, Su2, closely tracks the share of unmarried 
births, NBS. 
 
These are strong implications, and stark in their simplicity.  Furthermore, as emphasized above, they are 
independent of age and cohort. 
Figures 2 through 4 below provide striking support for the hypothesized relationships in the case 
of black women, who may be argued to be disadvantaged in terms of investment opportunities.  The plots 
cover the years 1969-2002, the period over which the necessary data are available separately for blacks.9 
Figure 2 shows (1+Su) and the married birth rate ratio, MBRR, presented as time series.  The data for 
women aged 20-24 appear in the first panel of figure 2.  The data for women aged 25-29 appear in the 
second panel, and so on.  The model predicts that (1+Su) and the married birth rate ratio will be equal, 
regardless of age or cohort.  The overall consistency of figure 2 with this hypothesis is impressive – all 
the more so in view of the notoriously noisy data available separately on the numbers of married and 
unmarried black women.  Figures 3 and 4 present strong evidence consistent with implications 2 and 3.   
(Figures 2-4 here) 
B.  Investment Opportunities 
 Using the results of section A as a benchmark, we can now investigate the role of investment 
opportunities facilitated by delayed childbearing.  As in the previous section, it will be useful to focus on 
the model’s results in terms of implications for birth rate ratios, since this eliminates unobservable 
parameters.  Because investment opportunities are hypothesized to be available only to the youngest 
group of women, it is important to separate effects for this age group from those over the remainder of the 
childbearing years. 
                                                          
9 Births by marital status are from National Vital Statistics Reports (2000, 48:16; 2002, 50:10; and 2003, 52:10).  
Total births are from Vital Statistics of the United States (www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm).  The numbers of married 
women (defined as married, spouse present) and total women are from U.S. Bureau of Census, Current Population 
Reports, Series P-20, various dates.  The number of unmarried women is calculated as the difference between total  









Because investment opportunities cause a representative group of the youngest women to delay 
childbearing, it reduces the number of both married and unmarried women in a cohort who give birth  
during the first childbearing period of life.  This reduces the total number of children born to both married 
and single women when they are young.  Those younger women who choose to delay childbearing also 
delay marriage, so the number of unmarried women in this age group rises relative to the benchmark case.  
With unmarried births falling and the number of unmarried women rising, the unmarried birth rate at this 
age (UBR1) must be lower than in the benchmark case. 
Like those who delay childbearing, the young women who do not delay childbearing are 
otherwise representative of their cohort, which means that non-delay women have children and marry at 
rates equal to the rates of the benchmark case.  Given that none of the delaying women marry, the only 
married women in the youngest group are women who choose not to delay.  Accordingly, the married 
birth rate of the cohort when it is young (MBR1) is the same as in the benchmark case.  The total birth rate 
(TBR1), is a weighted average of UBR1 and MBR1.  Since UBR1 falls relative to the benchmark value but 
MBR1 is unchanged, TBR1 falls – but proportionately less than UBR1.  Thus, the presence of investment 
opportunities causes the ratio MBR1/TBR1 to rise, and the ratio UBR1/TBR1 to fall, relative to the baseline 
case.  These effects are verified in eqs. (24) and (25), which follow directly from eqs. (12) through (14). 
 
MBRR1   =   MBR1/TBR1  =  (1+Su1 -2α)/(1-α)2  =  (1+Su1) if α = 0 Eq. (24) 
       >  (1+Su1) if α > 0 
 
UBRR1   =   UBR1/TBR1   =  [(Su1 - α)/(1-α)]2(1/Su1) =  Su1 if α = 0  Eq. (25) 
       <  Su1 if α > 0 
 
 
 Setting α equal to zero in eqs. (24) and (25) confirms that each birth rate ratio is equal to its 
benchmark value in the absence of investment opportunities.  (Compare to eqs. (21) and (22).)  In the 








(and testable) ways, as discussed above.  In particular, it can be shown that MBRR1 exceeds (1+Su), and 
UBRR1 falls short of Su, by an amount that increases monotonically in α.   
The nonmarital birth share for this age group is found by substituting eqs. (13) and (14) into (1): 
 
 
NBS1  =   [(Su1 - α)/(1-α)]2   =  (Su1)2  if α = 0   Eq. (26) 
     <  (Su1)2  if α > 0 
 
NBS1 reduces to its benchmark value, (Su1)2, when α is zero, but is otherwise less than (Su1)2.   Thus, the 
model predicts that the presence of investment opportunities – e.g. access to higher education or on-the-
job training – drives a wedge between the values of (Su1)2 and NBS1.  Note that NBS1 itself is invariant 
with respect to α, since the direct negative effect of α in eq. (26) is exactly offset by the indirect positive 
effect that α exerts through Su1.  Intuitively, the only births among the youngest group of women are due 
to the women in the non-delay group, and this group has marital and nonmarital births at the same rates as 
in the benchmark case.   
Remaining Age Groups 
In the remaining childbearing periods, women who did not delay childbearing in order to 
undertake investment continue having children at the benchmark rates.  Those who delayed now begin 
having children and they do so at higher rates than their non-delay counterparts  – a catch-up effect.  
However, the nonmarital, marital, and total birth rates of the delay group all rise in the same proportion, 
so the birth rate ratios of these women equal those of their non-delay counterparts.  Accordingly, the birth 
rate ratios for the cohort as a whole are the benchmark values given by eqs. (21) and (22).  Similarly, the 
nonmarital birth share is equal to its benchmark value, given by eq. (23), for women in the three later 
periods of childbearing. 
 To summarize, if investment opportunities are significantly available to young white women 
only, we expect a divergence from the baseline case for this group only.  Accordingly, we should observe:   
Implication 1:  MBRR exceeds (1+Su) in early childbearing years, but equals (1+Su) in later 









Implication 2: UBRR is less than Su in early childbearing years, but equals Su in later 
childbearing years. 
  
Implication 3: NBS exceeds the squared value of the single share, Su2, in early childbearing 
years, but equals Su2 in later childbearing years. 
 
Figures 5 through 7 below provide considerable support for the hypothesized relationships in the 
case of white women, who we presume have access to significant investment opportunities during their 
early childbearing years.  The plots cover the years 1957-2002, with the exception of women aged 35-39, 
for whom data by five-year interval begin in 1968.  In Figure 5, the married birth rate ratio substantially 
exceeds (1+Su) for the youngest group of women, while the two series match very closely for older age 
groups, consistent with the first of the three implications above. 
(Figures 5-7 here) 
Figure 6 provides evidence on the second implication.  In the first panel of figure 6, the 
unmarried birth rate ratio, UBRR, lies substantially below Su, as predicted by the theory.  The difference 
between the two series is much smaller in the remaining panels, which is also consistent with the theory.  
However, the second and last panels diverge, at least on average, from the strict prediction that UBRR 
and Su are exactly equal.  In the second panel, for women aged 25-29, UBRR falls somewhat short of Su, 
which is quite plausibly explained by generalizing the theory to permit investment opportunities in the 
second childbearing period, as well as the first.  In the final panel, for ages 35-39, Su now tends to fall 
somewhat short of UBRR, at least on average, a divergence not explained by the same generalization.  
Instead, it may reflect the more complex nature of childbearing and marriage status at the end of the 
childbearing years.  In any event, we examine these implications more formally in Section IV. 
In Figure 7, which examines the third and most comprehensive implication of the theory, we once 
again see striking consistency between the data and the theory.  The nonmarital birth share, NBS, 
substantially exceeds its benchmark value, Su2, for the youngest age group, while the two variables take 








C.  Racial Differences 
The model implications illustrated thus far are general, in that they are independent of the 
unobservable parameters that capture the desire to have children (P) and the timing of births (the θi).  That 
is, the implications hold even if blacks and whites have very different “tastes” regarding family size and 
the timing of births.  Here we explore a more restrictive form of the model, one in which blacks and 
whites are assumed to share the same preferences with respect to the number and timing of children.  The 
focus is on the effect of investment opportunities on age-specific total birth rates.  If preferences 
regarding childbearing are the same, then eqs. (14) and (17) imply that racial differences in total birth 
rates are due solely to racial differences in the investment opportunities available to young women. 
We begin by examining the assumption that blacks and whites are similar in the number of 
children they wish to have.  Figure 8 suggests that this is a good description of the facts for the age groups 
and time periods covered in this study.  The figure presents estimates by race of the number of births 
occurring between the ages of 20 and 39 for married and unmarried women combined.  The estimates are 
generated by (i) multiplying the annualized birth rates per thousand women by five to obtain 5-year birth 
rates, (ii) dividing by 1,000 to obtain births per woman, and (iii) adding together the resulting birth rates 
for women aged 20-24 at time t, women aged 25-29 at time t+5, women aged 30-34 at time t+10, and 
women aged 34-39 at time t+15.  The sum is recorded on the vertical axis of figure 8 against the year in 
which the women were aged 20-24, which identifies cohort, on the horizontal axis.  As the figure shows, 
these age-aggregated birth rates are very similar for blacks and whites throughout the period, becoming 
virtually indistinguishable for more recent cohorts. 
(Figure 8 here) 
Births occurring over the ages 20 to 39 capture most, but certainly not all, lifetime births.  The 
wider is the age range covered, however, the fewer and older are the cohorts for which this methodology 
can be used to estimate lifetime birth rates.  Basing estimates of lifetime birth rates on five-year birth rates 
for women aged 15-44, for example, means that the latest cohort for which estimates can be constructed 








desired family size for blacks and whites. Black women in this cohort had roughly 2.3 lifetime births as 
compared to 2.0 births for whites.  Furthermore, given the behavior of total fertility rates since the late 
1970s, the difference seems likely to have narrowed further for more recent cohorts.  Indeed, to the extent 
that the total fertility rates for women aged 15-44 are an indicator of lifetime birth rates – which would be 
the case in the absence of changes over time in childbearing preferences and the age composition of the 
population – the evidence suggests that lifetime birth rates for very recent cohorts of black and white 
women are virtually identical.10
Absent investment opportunities and differences in childbearing preferences, our baseline model 
predicts that total birth rates will decline with age, but will be the same for blacks and whites of a given 
age.  Incorporating investment opportunities into the model lowers birth rates for the youngest group of 
women and raises them for older groups (compare eqs. (14) and (17) for positive values of α).  If, 
however, investment opportunities have been significantly available for whites but much less so for 
blacks, then the ratio of the first-period birth rate to the second period birth rate should be lower for 
whites than for blacks.  That is, one should observe that black women “front-load” their childbearing 
relative to white women.  Indeed, as figure 9 demonstrates, this is the case.  The steady decline in the ratio 
for whites further suggests expanding opportunities for young white women over the period. 
(Figure 9 here) 
The theory also predicts that while the youngest group of black women should have higher birth 
rates than the youngest group of white women, older groups of blacks should have lower birth rates than 
older groups of whites.  Alternatively stated, the ratio of black to white births rates should exceed unity 
for the youngest women, but should be less than one for older groups, as confirmed in figure 10.  
(Figure 10 here) 
                                                          
10 See “Births: Final Data for 2002”, National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 52, No. 10, December 17, 2003, Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention, Table 4.  The total fertility rate for a particular year is the expected number of 
births to a hypothetical cohort of 1,000 women over the ages 15-44 under the assumption that they experience the 
same age-specific birth rates observed in that year.  It is an estimate of total lifetime births under the assumption that 








The empirical implications formulated in this section, along with the informal evidence presented, 
are provocative.  The implications are qualitatively unambiguous, in that effects are always signed, as 
well as quantitatively specific.  For example, in the absence of investment opportunities at a particular 
age, the model predicts that the ratio of the married birth rate to the total birth rate will equal one plus the  
single share.  That the data appear to so closely match such stark predictions is strong motivation for the 
more formal statistical tests to which we turn next. 
 
IV. Empirical Tests. 
 
Our theoretical model yields distinctive parameterizations for the marital birth rate ratio (MBRR), 
the nonmarital birth rate ratio (UBRR), and the nonmarital birth share (NBS).  The parameterizations 
differ in precise ways depending upon whether or not there are opportunities for human capital 
investment.  In this section, we estimate and formally test the model using the data introduced in section 
III.  The pooled data (two races and four age groups) yield a total of 309 observations.  For each of the 
model’s key predictions, we present estimates for three cases of interest.  In the first, no opportunities for 
investment in human capital are present.  In the second, investment opportunities are hypothetically 
available only to young white women aged 20-24.  In the third, investment opportunities may also be 
available to young black women aged 20-24.  While the data for white and black women are pooled in the 
estimation, we test for the likely differences between the two groups based upon the model predictions.  
Similar results are obtained when specifications for white and black women are estimated separately. 
Empirical models for MBRR, UBRR, and NBS follow directly from eqs. (24) – (26).  In each 
case, the model predictions below are nested in a single equation incorporating the binary variable W20-24, 
which takes the value one for white women aged 20-24 and zero otherwise:11
 
MBRRi = b0 + b1Sui +b2W20-24 + b3SuiW20-24,  i = 1, 2, 3, 4,    Eq. (27) 
 
  where b0 = 1, b1 = 1, b2 = -α2/(1-α)2 < 0, b3 = [1/(1-α)2] - 1 > 0.     
 
 
                                                          








UBRRi = c0 + c1Sui + c2W20-24 + c3SuiW20-24 +  c4(1/Sui)W20-24,  i = 1, 2, 3, 4, Eq. (28) 
 
  where c0 = 0, c1  = 1, c2 = -2α/(1-α)2 < 0, c3 =  [1/(1-α)2] - 1 > 0, c4 = α2/(1-α)2 > 0. 
 
 
NBSi = d0 + d1Sui2 + d2W20-24 + d3Sui2W20-24 + d4SuiW20-24,  i = 1, 2, 3, 4,  Eq. (29) 
 
 where d0 = 0, d1  = 1, d2 = α2/(1-α)2 > 0, d3 =  [1/(1-α)2] - 1 > 0, d4 = -2α/(1-α)2 < 0. 
 
A. Married Birth Rate Ratio 
For each variable, we begin by estimating the model corresponding to the special case of no 
investment opportunities.  Setting α=0 in eq. (27) produces the coefficient values b0=b1=1 and b2=b3=0, 
yielding the prediction that, in the absence of investment opportunities, MBRR is identically equal to 
(1+Su) for every age group.  Accordingly, only a constant and Su appear in the corresponding empirical 
specification, and the predictions tested are that both the constant and the coefficient on Su equal one.  
Indeed, estimates of this model reported in column (1) of table 1 yield a constant (0.9732) that is not 
significantly different from one at the five percent level but is significantly different from zero.  Similarly, 
the coefficient on Su (1.1379) is not significantly different from one, but is significantly different from 
zero.  Inferences are based on robust standard errors, reported in parentheses.  The latter correct for serial 
correlation, heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlations among the cross-sectional age groups.12  
(Table 1 here) 
 While the data do not reject the baseline model reported in the first column of table 1, they 
nonetheless support expanding the model to account for human capital investment by young white 
women.  A positive value of α in eq. (27) produces model predictions for white women aged 20-24 that 
contrast sharply with the no-investment case – an intercept strictly less than one and a coefficient on Su2 
strictly greater than one.   For all other race/age groups, however, the model predictions are the same as 
in the no-investment case; both the constant and the coefficient on Su should equal one. 
                                                          
12 All of the key variables exhibit non-stationarity, reflected by a failure to reject the null of a unit root in each case. 
In previous work (Gray et al., forthcoming a), we find significant co-integrating vectors for the corresponding 








Thus, if there is substantial human capital investment by white women aged 20-24, but not by 
women in other race/age groups, we again expect to find that the estimated values of b0 and b1 are not 
significantly different from one.  However, we also expect a negative intercept shift for the youngest 
group of white women, identified by the binary variable W20-24 in eq. (27), and a positive coefficient on 
the interaction between Su and W20-24.  That is, we expect b2<0 and b3>0.  All these predictions are born  
out in the second column of table 1.  We note that the interaction terms implied by the presence of  
investment opportunities for young white women are not only highly significant, but also collectively add 
significantly to the power of the equation, evidence of substantial investment by this group.13   
Eq. (27) provides the theoretical values of the coefficients b2 and b3, each of which is uniquely 
related to the delay parameter, α.  These restrictions can be solved individually for α and, in conjunction 
with the estimates of b2 and b3 reported in the column (2) of Table 1, imply values of the delay parameter.  
Although produced by separate calculations, the implied values of α are identical to two decimal places -- 
0.30 in each case.14  Thus, estimates of the theory’s implications for MBRR suggest that 30 percent of 
white women aged 20-24 delay childbirth and marriage.  
 The third column of table 1 reports the results of expanding the empirical model to account for 
the possibility of significant investment opportunities for young black women.  We expect the coefficients 
related to the binary variable for young black women (i.e., B20-24 and SuB20-24) to be insignificant in the 
absence of substantial investment opportunities for this group.  That prediction is born out in column 3 of 
table 1.  Neither coefficient is significantly different from zero – indeed, neither even exceeds the 
corresponding standard error. 
B. Unmarried Birth Rate Ratio 
 The results for UBRR are reported in table 2, also along with robust standard errors in 
parentheses.  The model predictions for the no-investment case, produced by setting α=0 in equation (28), 
                                                          
13 Expanding the empirical model to account for the possibility of human capital investment by white women aged 
25-29 yields insignificant results for this older age group. 
14 For a value of α equal to 0.30, the data fail to reject the model restrictions given in eq. (27), either individually or 








are c1=1 and c0=c2=c3=c4=0.  That is, UBRR is identically equal to the single share, Su, for every age 
group.  Accordingly, the empirical model for this case includes, as for MBRR above, only a constant and 
Su.  Here, however, the predictions tested are a constant of zero along with a coefficient on the single 
share (Su) equal to one.  The estimates reported in column (1) of table 2 are consistent with these 
predictions – a constant (0.0066) that is not significantly different from zero at the five percent level and a 
coefficient on Su (0.9369) that is not significantly different from unity.   
(Table 2 here) 
Again, however, the data support expanding the model to account for human capital investment 
by young white women.  A positive value of α in eq. (28) implies a negative intercept shift for the 
youngest group of white women, identified by W20-24, a positive coefficient on the interaction between Su 
and W20-24, and a positive coefficient on a similar interaction of W20-24 with 1/Su.  That is, we expect c2<0, 
c3>0, and c4 >0.  The predicted values of the intercept and the coefficient on Su remain zero and one, 
respectively – that is, c0 = 0 and c1 = 1.   These predictions are born out in column (2) of table 2, which 
reports highly significant coefficients on the interaction terms associated with investment by young white 
women, and a substantial increase in the power of the equation.15   
The coefficients associated with the variable W20-24 and its interactions are, again, uniquely 
related to the delay parameter, α.  As in the case of MBRR, these restrictions can be solved individually 
for α and, in conjunction with the estimates of c2, c3, and c4 reported in the column (2) of Table 2, imply 
values of the delay parameter, α.  The implied values are again nearly identical; all lie in the range .38 to 
.39.16  Thus, estimates of our model’s implications for UBRR suggest that just under 40 percent of white 
women aged 20-24 delay childbirth and marriage.  
                                                          
15 Expanding the empirical model to account for the possibility of human capital investment by white women aged 
25-29 yields much smaller, but statistically significant, results for those coefficients, consistent with a model in 
which smaller investments continue into the late twenties. 
16 The coefficient restrictions given in eq. (28) cannot be rejected at the five percent level, either individually or 








The third column of table 2 reports the results of expanding the empirical model to account for 
the possibility of significant investment opportunities for young black women.  The additional terms (i.e., 
BB20-24, SuB20-24, and (1/Su)B20-24B
                                                          
) are statistically insignificant, suggesting, as for MBRR in table 1, the 
absence of substantial investment opportunities for this group.   
C. Nonmarital Birth share 
 The results for NBS are presented in table 3.  For the no-investment case, produced by setting 
α=0 in equation (29), the theory predicts d1=1 and d0=d2=d3=d4=0.  That is, NBS is identically equal to 
Su2 for every age group.  Accordingly, only Su2 and a constant appear in the corresponding empirical 
specification, and the predictions tested are that the constant is zero and the coefficient on the Su2 is one.  
Indeed, the estimates of this model reported in column (1) of table 1 yield a constant (-0.0065) not 
significantly different from zero at the five percent level and a coefficient on Su2 (0.9733) not 
significantly different from unity.  
(Table 3 here) 
Once again, the data support expanding the model to account for human capital investment by 
young white women.  A positive value of α in eq. (29) implies a positive intercept shift for the youngest 
group of white women, identified by W20-24; a positive coefficient on the interaction of Su2 with W20-24; 
and a negative coefficient on the interaction of W20-24 with Su.  Thus, we expect d2>0, d3>0, and d4<0.  
For all other groups, the model predicts a zero intercept and a coefficient on Su2 equal to one – d0=0 and 
d1=1.  All these predictions are born out in column (2) of Table 3.  As in the cases of MBRR and UBRR, 
highly significant coefficients on the interaction terms associated with investment by young white women 
and a substantial increase in the power of the equation provide evidence of investment by young white 
women.17
17 Permitting human capital investments to extend into the second age group (25-29) yields insignificant results for 








 The coefficients associated with the variable W20-24 and its interactions are, once again, uniquely 
related to the delay parameter, α.  These restrictions can be solved individually for α and, in conjunction  
with the estimates of d2, d3, and d4 reported in the column (2) of Table 3, imply values of the delay 
parameter, α.  In this case, the implied values all lie in the range .40 to .42.18  Thus, estimates of our 
model’s implications for NBR suggest that slighly more than 40 percent of white women aged 20-24 
delay childbirth and marriage.  
Finally, column 3 of table 3 reports insignificant results for additional terms that capture the 
possibility of investment opportunities for young black women (i.e., B20-24, Su2BB
                                                          
20-24, and SuB20-24).   As 
in earlier cases, none of the individual coefficients for these variables exceeds the corresponding standard 
error, once again suggesting the absence of substantial opportunities for this group. 
Overall, the results reported in this section provide considerable support for three key predictions 
of our theoretical model:  1) changes in marital and nonmarital birth rate ratios (MBRR and UBRR) and 
the nonmarital fertility share (NBS) all appear to have been driven primarily by changes in marriage 
behavior, rather than by changes in fertility, per se;  2) opportunities for investments in human capital 
play a distinctive role in the timing of marriage and fertility over the adult childbearing years; and 3) 
racial differences in these investments explain key differences in the marital and fertility patterns for 
black and white women.  The coefficient estimates are inconsistent with significant delays in childbearing 
and marriage by young black women in response to human capital investment opportunities.  By contrast, 
our empirical results are strikingly consistent in supporting the presence of such delays among young 
white women, with implied values for the proportion of young white women who delay childbearing and 
marriage in order to make investments in human capital ranging from .30 to .42.  
18 The coefficient restrictions given in eq. (29) cannot be rejected individually at the five percent level for choices of 








V. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 
 Our theoretical model and empirical estimates attribute observed increases in nonmarital and 
marital birth rates in recent decades primarily to a decline in the marriage rate, not to changes in fertility 
behavior, per se.  Our explanation is consistent with increases in both nonmarital and marital birth rates, 
even in the absence of changes in the total birth rates.  As the proportion of women who marry declines, 
the birth rates of unmarried and married necessarily rise, all else the same, with the increase in the 
unmarried birth rate necessarily rising proportionately more than either the married or total birth rates.   
Accordingly, the nonmarital birth share – the share of births to unmarried women – also rises.  If follows 
that the observation of higher marital and nonmarital birth rates, along with a higher nonmarital birth 
share, for black women than for white women may reflect differences in marriage behavior, not desired 
family size.  Indeed, the marriage rate is substantially lower for blacks than whites, while total birth rates 
for black and white women are nearly identical in recent years. 
 The theoretical model further predicts that opportunities for investment in human capital early in 
the childbearing years will introduce differences between black and white women in the timing of 
childbearing and marriage decisions.  Empirical estimates suggest that a substantial portion of the 
youngest group of white women (ages 20-24) delay marriage and childbearing to pursue investments in 
human capital, while the youngest group of black women do not – at least not significantly so.  These 
results, along with the apparent similarity in total lifetime birth rates for blacks and whites, imply that 
black women have more children early in their childbearing years than white women, while the reverse is 
true later in life, predictions confirmed by the data. 
 Our findings are particularly relevant in the context of studies that take marriage behavior as 
given in evaluating the effects of public policy on fertility, especially on differences between black and 
white women.  (See, for example, Baughman and Dickert-Conklin, 2003.)  The direct role of policy on 
changes in fertility will likely be overstated in these studies relative to the role of changes in marriage 








evaluation of the effects of public policy.  Hence, future research might productively be focused more 
directly on changes in marriage behavior, a direction taken in recent papers by Bitler et al (2004), 
Fitzgerald and Ribar (2004), Grogger and Bronars (2001), and Moffitt (2000).  
  Finally, our findings suggest that much of the difference between birth rates for black and white 
women arises from differences in decisions about investments in human capital early in the childbearing 
years.  It will be important to explore more directly the link to investments in human capital, which we 
have done only indirectly here.  Nonetheless, the paper’s results suggest that increasing the incentives and 
opportunities for human capital investment by young black women may be an especially useful direction 
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Table 1   Married Birth Rate Ratio (MBRR)  
                     (robust standard errors)   
     
Variable Predicted No Investment Investment 
 Coeff Investment Whites 
Whites & 
Blacks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
C 1 0.9732** 0.9890** 1.0400** 
  (0.0988) (0.0375) (0.0201) 
Su 1 1.1379** 0.9863** 0.8206** 
  (0.2067) -0.0789 (0.0521) 
W(20-24) -  -0.1808* -0.2318* 
   (0.0787) (0.0624) 
Su*W(20-24) +  1.0156** 1.1813** 
   (0.1954) (0.1461) 
B(20-24) 0   0.1001 
    (0.1043) 
Su*B(20-24) 0   0.1042 
    (0.1593) 
     
R2  0.6812 0.8954 0.9187 
nobs  309 309 309 
     
*(**) significantly different from zero at the 5 (1) percent level. 
     
Notes:  Dependent variable is the married birth rate ratio, the ratio of the  
            marital birth rate to the total birth rate (MBRR). Su is the single share, 
            the ratio of unmarried to total women.  Data are age group (20-24,  
            25-29, 30-34, 35-39) by race (white, black), 1957-2002 for white 
            women (1968-2002 for 35-39), and 1969-2002 for black women.   
            See text for further details.  Standard errors are robust standard  
            errors, corrected for serial correlation, time-varying heteroskedasticity,  














Table 2  Unmarried Birth Rate Ratio (UBRR)  
                   (robust standard errors)   
     
Variable Predicted No Investment Investment 
 Coeff Investment Whites 
Whites & 
Blacks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
C 0 0.0066 0.0235 0.0053 
  (0.0869) (0.0413) (0.0418) 
Su 1 0.9369** 0.9928** 1.0538** 
  (0.1600) -0.0813 (0.0942) 
W(20-24) -  -1.9704** -1.9523** 
   (0.7156) (0.6280) 
Su*W(20-24) +  1.6832** 1.6222** 
   (0.6180) (0.5305) 
1/Su*W(20-24) +  0.3883* 0.3883* 
   (0.1780) (0.1574) 
B(20-24) 0   -0.8260 
    (2.1143) 
Su*B(20-24) 0   0.5534 
    (1.3729) 
1/Su*B(20-24) 0   0.2454 
    (0.7797) 
     
R2  0.7265 0.9154 0.9216 
nobs  309 309 309 
     
*(**) significantly different from zero at the 5 (1) percent level. 
     
Notes:  Dependent variable is the unmarried birth rate ratio, the ratio of the  
            nonmarital birth rate to the total birth rate (UBRR). Su is the single share, 
            the ratio of unmarried to total women.  Data are age group (20-24,  
            25-29, 30-34, 35-39) by race (white, black), 1957-2002 for white 
            women (1968-2002 for 35-39), and 1969-2002 for black women.   
            See text for further details.  Standard errors are robust standard  
            errors, corrected for serial correlation, time-varying heteroskedasticity,  

















Table 3 Nonmarital Birth Share (NBS)   
                  (robust standard errors)    
     
Variable Predicted No Investment Investment 
 Coeff Investment Whites 
Whites & 
Blacks 
  (1) (2) (3) 
     
C 0 -0.0065 0.0071 -0.0017 
  (0.0287) (0.0108) (0.0085) 
Su2 1 0.9733** 1.0066** 1.0736** 
  (0.0829) (0.0331) (0.0359) 
W(20-24) +  0.4564** 0.46522** 
   (0.1397) (0.0981) 
Su2*W(20-24) +  1.9537** 1.8867** 
   (0.5189) (0.3385) 
Su*W(20-24) -  -2.2503** -2.2503** 
   (0.5776) (0.3929) 
B(20-24) 0   0.1936 
    (0.3316) 
Su2*B(20-24) 0   0.4368 
    (0.5665) 
Su*B(20-24) 0   -0.6752 
    (0.8826) 
     
R2  0.9156 0.9799 0.9842 
nobs  309 309 309 
     
*(**) significantly different from zero at the 5 (1) percent level.  
     
Notes:  Dependent variable is the nonmarital birth share, the ratio of the  
            nonmarital birth rate to the total birth rate (NBS). Su is the single share, 
            the ratio of unmarried to total women.  Data are age group (20-24,  
            25-29, 30-34, 35-39) by race (white, black), 1957-2002 for white 
            women (1968-2002 for 35-39), and 1969-2002 for black women.   
            See text for further details.  Standard errors are robust standard   
            errors, corrected for serial correlation, time-varying heteroskedasticity,  





















                  Figure 1.  Women Ordered by Preference for Children (γ) 
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Women who do not delay 
Let T be total number of women in cohort t.  Since a fraction α of these women choose to delay 
childbearing, the number of women who do not delay (and therefore begin giving birth in the first period 
of life) is (1-α)T.  The childbearing and marriage behavior of non-delay women conform to the baseline 
behavior described in sections II.B. and II.C. of the text.  We identify by UN the number of non-delay 
women who choose to be single, and by MN the number who choose to marry in the first period of life.  
Since it is the first UN ordered women in the set of (1-α)T non-delay women who are single, and the 
remainder who marry, setting n=UN and z=(1-α)T in propositions (P1) and (P2) produces the non-marital 
and marital life-time births rates of these women.  Age-specific birth rates are produced by multiplying 
the resulting lifetime birth rates by the θi, which determine the timing of births in the baseline case.  
Recognizing that (1-α)T is equal to (UN+MN) then produces  
UBRiN = θi(1/2)(SuN)P,   where SuN = [UN/(MN+UN)],              (A1) 
 
MBRiN= θi(1/2)(1+SuN)P,                  (A2) 
 
TBRiN = θi(1/2)P, for i = 1, 2, 3, 4.                (A3) 
 
Note that SuN is the share of single women in the non-delay group, which will differ from the single share 
for the cohort as a whole during the first period. 
Women who delay
For the αT women who decide to delay childbearing, the number of births in the first period of 
life is zero.  Because the benefits of marriage are presumed to depend on the presence of children, we 
assume that none of these women marry in the first period of life.  Accordingly, the non-marital and total 
birth rates of this group are zero in the first period of life.  Since there are no married women among this 
group in the first period, the married birth rate is undefined. 
As described earlier, the women who delay childbearing do not reduce lifetime births, but 
redistribute childbearing over the remaining three childbearing periods, resulting in age-specific birth 
 
rates equal to lifetime birth rates multiplied by θi/(1-θ1) for i=2, 3, and 4.  The marriage criterion of the 
delaying women in a cohort are no different from those who do not delay – the marriages just take place a 
period later.  Denote by UD the number in this group who do not marry in the second period (or later) and 
by MD the number who do marry, where UD+MD=αT.  For the delaying group of women, then,  
UBRiD = [θi/(1-θ1)](1/2)(SuD)P,   where SuD = [UD/(MD+UD)],              (A4) 
 
MBRiD = [θi/(1-θ1)](1/2)(1+SuD)P,                  (A5) 
 
TBRiD = [θi/(1-θ1)](1/2)P, for i = 2, 3, 4.                (A6) 
 
Putting it Together 
1.  First Period Analysis 
 Recall that there are no first period births or marriages among women who delay childbearing.   It 
follows that the number of births to unmarried women in cohort τ during the first period of life can be 
expressed as the product of two terms.  The first is the number of women who choose not to delay 
childbearing in the first period and also choose to be single, or UN.  The second term is the first-period 
birth rate of this sub-population, UBR1N.  The number of non-delay women in cohort τ is (1-α)T and so 
the number of those women who do not marry is equal to SuN(1-α)T.  The first-period birth rate of this 
group is given by equation (A1).  So the total number of births in the first period (all of which occur 
among the non-delay population) is 
UB1N  =   UNUBR1N  =  θ1SuN (1-α)T(1/2)(SuN)P = θ1(SuN)2(1-α)T(P/2). 
Similarly, the number of marital births to the cohort during the first period is given by    
  
MB1N  =   MNMBR1N  =  θ1(1-SuN)(1-α)T(1/2)(1+SuN)P = θ1[1-(SuN)2](1-α)T(P/2). 
 
Total births, the sum of UB1N and MB1N, are  
 
 TB1N =   θ1(1-α)T(P/2). 
 
To obtain the first-period unmarried birth rate for the cohort as a whole, UBR1 (no superscript), 
divide the number of first-period unmarried births in the cohort by the total number of women in the 
cohort who are unmarried in the first period.  First-period unmarried births, due entirely to the non-delay
 
group of women, are UB1N, given above.  The number of single women in the cohort is the sum of the 
number of non-delay women who do not marry, SuN(1-α)T, and the number of delaying women (none of 
whom marry), αT.  Accordingly, the first-period unmarried birth rate for cohort τ can be expressed as  
UBR1 =  θ1(SutN)2(1-α)T(P/2)/[SuN(1-α)T + αT]  
  =  θ1(SuN)2(1-α)(P/2)/[SuN (1-α) + α].              (A7) 
 
Similarly, the first-period married and total birth rates are 
MBR1  =  θ1[1-(SuN)2](1-α)(P/2)]/(1-SuN)(1-α) 
 =  θ1[1+(SuN)](P/2)                (A8) 
 
TBR1  = θ1(1-α)(P/2)                       (A9) 
 
 Finally, denote the first-period single share of the combined (delay and non-delay) population by 
Su1 (different from SuN).  The share Su1, which is the share observed in the data, is equal to the total 
number of women in the cohort who are unmarried in the first period (derived earlier) divided by the size 
of the cohort, or  
Su1  =  [SuN (1-α)T + αT]/ T  =  SuN (1-α) + α  
Solving for SuN in terms of Su1 gives 
 
 SuN =  (Su1 - α)/(1-α)                (A10) 
 
Substituting (A10) into (A7) through (A9) allows us to write the first-period birth rates in terms of the 
observed first-period share of unmarried women in a cohort.  
UBR1 =  θ1(P/2)(Su1 - α )2/(1-α)Su1                   (A11) 
 
MBR1  =  θ1(1-2α+Su1)(P/2)/(1-α)               (A12) 
 
TBR1  =  θ1(1-α)(P/2)                 (A13) 
 
2.  Analysis for the Remaining Periods 
 For the remaining three childbearing periods, the birth rates for non-delay women are provided in 
(A1) through (A3), and those for the delay group in (A4) through (A6).  The unmarried share of the non-
delay women is unchanged at its first-period value, SuN.  However, some of the delay group, none of  
whom married in the first period of life, will marry in the second period of life when they begin to have 
their children.  Since the benefits of marriage depend on lifetime births, and these women exhibit the 
same distribution of γ as those who did not delay, they will marry in the same proportion as the non-delay 
women – that is, SuD=SuN.   Accordingly, the share of unmarried women for the cohort as a whole, Sui, 
and the unmarried shares of the non-delay and delaying portions of the cohort, are the same for i=2, 3 and 
4.  We denote the common value by Su.   
 From the birth rates and the numbers of unmarried, married, and total women in the two groups 
of women – delay and non-delay – the unmarried, married, and total births of each group for the last three 
childbearing periods can be calculated: 
UBiN  =   UNUBRiN  =  Su(1-α)Tθi(1/2)SuP = θiSu2(1-α)T(P/2), 
 
MBiN  =   MNMBRiN  =  (1-Su)(1-α)Tθi(1/2)(1+Su)P = θi(1-Su2)(1-α)T(P/2), 
 
 TBiN =   θi(1-α)T(P/2), 
 
UBiD  =   UDUBRiD   =  SuαT[θi//(1-θ1)](1/2)SuP  
=  [θi//(1-θ1)]Su2αT(P/2), 
 
MBiD  =   MDMBRiD  =  (1-Su)αT[θi//(1-θ1)](1/2)(1+Su)P 
=  (1-Su2)αT(P/2), 
 
 TBiD =   [θi//(1-θ1)]αT(P/2),  for i = 2, 3, and 4. 
 
Summing UBiN and UBiD and dividing by the sum of UN and UD gives the per-period unmarried birth 
rates for the cohort as a whole, UBRi, as given by equation (15) of the text, repeated here for convenience.  
Similar calculations produce MBRi and TBRi, as given in equations (16) and (17) of the text: 
 
UBRi =  θi(P/2)Su[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)]                     (A15) 
 
MBRi  =  θi(P/2)(1+Su)[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)]                 (A16) 
 
TBRi  =  θi(P/2)[1+αθ1/(1-θ1)], for i = 2, 3, and 4.                        (A17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
